INTRODUCTION
Survey indicate that over 38 million persons had no health insurance from any source at The United States has experienced a any time during 1992 (Employee Benefit substantial increase in the inequality of the Research Institute 1994). These individuals economic structure, with household income are likely to postpone or forgo visits to health becoming more concentrated among persons care practitioners for all but the most urgent with the greatest wealth (U.S. Bureau of the conditions, and are consequently disadvanCensus 1993). Social stratification is usually taged with respect to health (St. Peter, operationalized in terms of occupational Newacheck, and Halfon 1992; U.S. Conearnings, prestige, or total accumulated gress, Office of Technology Assessment wealth. A cogent argument can be made that, 1992) . in the United States at least, health insurance
The high number of persons without health constitutes another resource that is unequally insurance, the escalating number of persons distributed. Data from the Current Population with inadequate insurance, and the increasing costs of health care (over $473 billion in 1991) (Levit et al. 1993) contribute to the sional debate. The reforms proposed vary considerably, and include discussions of managed competition (Staines 19931 , health insurance purchasing cooperatives (Kronick 1993) , and pay or play schemes (Holahan and Zedlewski 1992) . The common thread of these proposals is their continued reliance upon employers to finance the health insurance of their workers (Field and Shapiro 1993; Zelman 1994) , unlike in other industrial countries where health care benefits are provided by right of citizenship and are financed by progressive taxes (Starfield 1991) . Most proposals do, however, provide exclusions for factors that would prove detrimental to business (e.g., excluding small businesses or part-time workers). We anticipate that these types of exclusions will affect subgroups of workers differently. As a consequence, it is critical that we understand the factors that account for differences in the receipt of insurance among underrepresented groups in the population. The purpose of this research is to examine the health insurance patterns of the working poor (defined here as workers with household incomes below the poverty line), and to compare the antecedents of employer-sponsored coverage of this group to those of higher incomes.' The problems faced by the working poor are of particular interest for several reasons. First, despite popular folklore that contends that a job is a ticket to a "better" life, this is not always the case, at least with respect to insurance coverage. National data reveal that 84 percent of the uninsured are either employed or are dependents of employed persons (House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and Environment 1993). Data from the 1977 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES) indicate that the working poor were two times more likely to be uninsured than were poor persons without jobs (Berk and Wilensky 1987) . Berk and Wilensky (1987) justifiably conclude that being employed may in fact serve to restrict access to medical care for the poor rather than enhance it.
second, most of the working poor do not qualify for public health insurance programs even when their employers fail to insure them. Medicaid was created to fill in the gaps in coverage among the poor who were without insurance, but stringent eligibility requirements prevent most poor persons from accessing this program. Only 46 percent of the poor and 10 percent of persons with incomes between the poverty level and 200 percent of poverty level have Medicaid coverage (House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health and Environment 1993). The employed are overrepresented among those poor deemed ineligible for Medicaid.
Finally. health insurance benefits have eroded during the past decade, with the erosion occurring more heavily among working poor and low income individuals. Seccombe (forthcoming) reports that the percentage of persons without insurance increased by 52 percent between 1977 and 1987 among the working poor, whereas it decreased by 10 percent among those with household incomes over 200 percent of poverty level. Moreover, other data indicate a trend toward part-time, part-year, and temporary work (Pfeffer and Baron 1988 ; U.S. Department of Labor 1993), a growth in the number of small firms (U.S Department of Labor 1993), a decline in union membership (Goldfield 1987) , and an increase in service sector jobs (Colatosti 1992) , factors experienced disproportionately by poor and low-income workers.
Hypotheses
Despite the plethora of data indicating a positive relationship between income and the odds of receiving employer-sponsored coverage, we have a poor understanding of the antecedents of coverage within a multivariate context, and how these antecedents may vary across income categories. Specifically, why do poor workers have such low rates of coverage as compared to other workers? Many of the sociodemographic characteristics and employment contexts which are associated with the receipt of employer-sponsored coverage vary by income, such as race and ethnic background, education level, gender, age, marital status, residential location, number of hours employed, type of industry, work force size, and union membership (Chollet 1994; Cooper and Johnson 1993; Levit, Olin, and Letsch 1992; Seccombe 1993; Seccombe, Clarke, and Coward 1994 ; U.S. General Accounting Office 1992). It is not known whether these correlates of employer-sponsored insurance Coverage operate in a similar fashion across income categories, particularly in a multivariate context. A number of scenarios could account for the differences in insurance coverage across income categories that have been observed. It could be that the same relationships are operative in all settings but are present to varying degrees among income groups. For example, working in a large firm may increase the odds of having employersponsored insurance in all income groups; however, poor workers may simply be underrepresented in large firms compared to higher income workers. Or, it could be that variables influence coverage differently across income groups, resulting in the discrepancies in rates that have been observed. For example, union membership may increase the odds of receiving employer-sponsored insurance for those in only one income category, and have no effect on others.
Toward the goal of illuminating the plight of the working poor with respect to employersponsored coverage, several hypotheses are tested. Using a sample of employed adults, we anticipate the following relationships.
(Hl) The working poor are less likely to receive employer-sponsored health insurance, and they are more likely to remain completely uninsured, as compared to higher income workers.
We do not expect government programs to compensate for lower-than-expected rates of employer-sponsored coverage because poor workers generally do not meet eligibility requirements. Moreover, we do not expect the working poor to purchase private coverage, in large numbers, because of cost. Consequently we anticipate that the working poor comprise a disproportionate number of the uninsured.
(H2) The employment context includes critical antecedents of employer-sponsored coverage which, as a set, explain variation in employer-sponsored coverage beyond that which is explained by sociodemographic or human capital factors.
Human capital theory articulates that variations in compensation (e.g., pay, job benefits) reflect differences in the investment in personal skills, such as educational level (Becker 1975, 198 1 ). Yet research spanning over a decade calls into question human capital theory. We anticipate here, instead, that occupational characteristics are the most critical antecedents of employer-sponsored coverage. Labor market theories have been employed successfully to explain variations in pay (Bibb and Form 1977) , bargaining (Sakamoto and Chen 1991), pensions (Quadagno 1988) , other working conditions (Glass 1990) , and, recently, health insurance and other medical benefits (O'Rand 1986; Seccombe 1993) . Both O'Rand (1986) and Seccombe (1993) suggest that occupational conditions are more critical in determining insurance status than are human capital or sociodemographic factors. We want to extend their research by (a) examining both the independent effects of occupational characteristics using a more recent national sample, and by (b) examining whether employment conditions as a set explain a significant portion of the variation in employer-sponsored coverage beyond that which is explained by human capital and sociodemographic factors.
(H3) Employment context is more likely to influence the probability of employersponsored coverage among the working poor than among the non-poor.
There is a relatively large pool of lowerskilled workers, and consequently employers are able to secure workers without offering fringe benefits such as health insurance. These employers do not find it necessary to offer benefits as a method to compete for a labor force, and persons filling these jobs are generally powerless to demand them. Thus, the decision of whether to offer health insurance is based on other criteria, such as other features of the occupation. For example, we anticipate that the odds of a janitor receiving insurance will increase if he or she works at a job that is unionized, or works in a large firm, or is employed with a multiple-site employer. That is, we anticipate variation in coverage based upon the occupational characteristics of low income workers.
In contrast, in order to compete for a relatively smaller pool of highly-skilled workers, employers must offer a better and more comprehensive benefits package. Because most employers offer health insurance to their higher-skilled workers (i.e., there is less variation), the employment context is a less critical antecedent of coverage. Thus, for example, we anticipate that the insurance status of the higher-paid computer programmer is less dependent on other features of his or her occupational context.
METHODS

Data and Sample
The data used in this research are from the 1987 NMES, which provides detailed national estimates of health insurance coverage in the United States. Four rounds of interviews were conducted during calendar year 1987, representing the civilian, noninstitutionalized population living in approximately 15,000 households and noninstitutional group quarters during the calendar year 1987. Complete information was obtained from 80 percent of the households selected. Because of the continuing policy interests in vulnerable groups, low income persons (among others) were oversampled, relative to their proportion in the general population (for additional sampling information, see Edwards and Berlin 1989) .
The subsample used in this research is from Round Four (i.e., the last wave of data collection), in order to enable us to ascertain the income of the respondent during the entire calendar year. The subsample consists of one employed adult -aged 18 through 64 -from each "insurable unit." Insurable units were constructed within households and families to include individuals who had access to insurance coverage through another family member by virtue of their status as a spouse or dependent. However, two unrelated adults living in the same household, and adult children not attending school, were considered separate insurable units. Due to the de~endence of the insurance status of individuals within the same insurable unit, only one individual from each unit was selected for inclusion in the analyses. Our preference was to include full-time workers when available. If only one adult in the insurable unit was employed full-time, he or she was selected for inclusion in the sample. If an insurable unit contained more than one full-time employee, one was randomly selected for inclusion. If it contained no full-time workers. then one part-time worker was selected. Thus, this sample represents those individuals who are most likely to receive insurance from their employer when offered, and therefore should provide conservative estimates of coverage.
The sample was restricted to adults under age 65 because the elderly qualify for health benefits under the Medicare program. It consists of 7,734 adults aged 18 through 64 who were employed at the time of the interview (but not self-employed), with complete data on their poverty status.* The data released for public use are weighted to account for the design effects of the sampling strategy employed by the NMES.3 Missing data are deleted in multivariate a n a l y s e~.~ Nearly 8 percent (7.7%) of the subsample (N = 595) is classified as poor.5 These employed individuals have household incomes below the poverty line, which in 1987, the year of data collection, was $1 1,5 19 for a family of four with two children. Another 15.2 percent of respondents (N = 1,172) had household incomes between the poverty level and 200 percent of the poverty level, or between $1 1,520 and $23,040 for a family of four in 1987. These individuals are labeled here as "economically vulnerable," because even a modest financial setback (e.g., illness, temporary unemployment) could quickly pull them into poverty. 
Variables
The primary variables of interest in this research are the presence and source of health insurance coverage. Respondents were initially coded as having health insurance (0) and having no health insurance of any type (1). Those who do have insurance were further categorized by the type of insurance they have: (1) employer-sponsored insurance in the individual's own name through an employer or union; (2) employer-sponsored insurance, but in another person's name rather than in the name of the individual; (3) public insurance (e.g., Medicaid or similar state-run program); (4) privately-purchased insurance; and (5) Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS) (for those persons associated with the military). Approximately five percent of the sample (N = 405) had two or more types of health insurance coverage, and these are included in all the appropriate insurance categories in Table 2 . Of particular interest in the multivariate analyses is whether persons receive employer-sponsored health insurance in their own name.6
Seven variables were used to describe the occupational characteristics and employment context of the employee. Number of hours employed is coded as (1) fewer than 20 hours per week; (2) 20 to 35 hours per week; and (3) more than 35 hours per week, Union membership is ascertained (yes or no). Respondents were asked whether they worked for a multisite establishment (yes or no). Work force size is measured with a series of dummy variables: (1) fewer than 10 employees; (2) 10 to 25; (3) 26 to 100; and (4) more than 100 employees. A series of six dummy variables represents the industry in which respondents work. The categories are collapsed from the U.S. Census Bureau to include (1) construction/repair; (2) agriculture/forestry/fishing/manufacturing;(3) transportation/communications/utilities; (4) sales; (5) finance/insurance/professional/publicadministration; and (6) personal servicelentertainmentlrecreation. The respondent's wages are coded as (1) less than $3.50 per hour; (2) $3.50 to $4.99; (3) $5.00 to $7.49; (4) $7.50 to $9.99; and (5) $10 and over. Finally, tenure on the job for less than one year is included (yes or no).
Eight human capital/sociodemographic variables are included since they covary with levels of employee compensation. Previous research has documented that women, younger persons, those who are unmarried, ethnic minorities, and those who live in rural areas are less likely to be insured through an employer than are their counterparts (Coward, Clarke, and Seccombe 1993; Kronick 1991; Levit et al. 1992; O'Rand 1986; Seccombe 1993 ; U. S. General Accounting Office 1992). Furthermore, persons with these characteristics are also more likely to be poor (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1993). Thus, the effects of these variables are controlled in multivariate analyses using dummy variables. Respondents' sex is included. Age is coded as (1) less than age 35; or (2) aged 35 and over, in order to distinguish young wage earners from those who have more experience in the labor force. Marital status is coded as (1) currently married; or (2) unmarried (including divorced, widowed, or never-married). Race and ethnicity are coded as (1) White; (2) Black; or (3) other.' Residence is dichotomized as (1) living in a metropolitan area; or (2) living in a nonmetropolitan area. We include whether the respondent has any other family member who had employer-sponsored health insurance in their own name (yes or no) . The presence of one or more children under age 18 in the home is ascertained (yes or no). Finally, respondents' education is coded as (1) less than high school; (2) high school graduate; and (3) more than high school. Table 1 compares the sociodemographicl human capital and occupational characteristics of the sample, across income categories. The working poor are disproportionately female, young, unmarried, members of racial or ethnic minority groups, and living in nonmetropolitan areas. They are less likely to have other familv members who have employer-sponsored health insurance coverage in their own names. They are more likely than the non-poor (although less likely than the economically vulnerable) to have at least one child under age 18 in the home. They also have the lowest mean number of years of education as compared with the other groups. The data also reveal that the working poor are less likely to work full-time than are either the economically vulnerable or the non-poor are less likely to work full-time than are either the economically vulnerable or the non-poor; they are less likely to be members of unions, to work for a multisite employer, and to work in large firms. Moreover, the working poor are employed in substantially different industries than are the non-poor, and earn significantly less per hour. Finally, they are also more likely to have been on the job for less than one year.
Analysis
We first analyzed the data to examine differences in the presence and type of health insurance across income categories. Second, using logistic regression models, we examined: (1) the extent to which human capital, sociodemographic, and occupational characteristics (both individually and as a set) are associated with the receipt of employersponsored health insurance; and (2) whether occupational characteristics influence the odds of being uninsured the same way, across income thresholds. Because the data were weighted to account for the design effects of the sampling strategy, the weights were normed to be equal to our final sample size (Clogg and Eliason 1987) . 49 .8 percent of the economically vulnerable, and 75.4 percent of the non-poor. Furthermore, the working poor respondents are also less likely than the non-poor to have employer-sponsored insurance in another's name, usually a spouse (6.7% and 9.6%, respectively).
RESULTS
The data reveal that the working poor are more likely to receive public insurance (e.g., Medicaid) than are persons in other income groups. A critical finding remains obvious, however: Very few of the working poor receive public insurance, despite their need. Only 10.2 percent of the working poor receive public insurance while, instead, nearly half remain completely uninsured.
No differences were noted in the percentage of adults who have purchased insurance or CHAMPUS privately. However, it should be emphasized that pri;ately-purchased insurance represents a significantly larger bite out the budgets of poor and economically vulnerable persons than they do for the non-poor, Next, we estimate the extent to which human capitallsociodemographic characteristics and employment context are associated with the receipt of employer-sponsored health insurance. Table 3 reports the odds ratios obtained from hierarchical logistic regression
We want discern how (a) each variable, and (b) sets of variables, influence the probability of lacking employer-sponsored insurance in one's own name (versus receiving e m~l o~e r -s~O n s o r e d insurance in one's Own name).
Model 1 includes the odds ratios for the set of human capitallsociodemographic factors. Females (Odds = 1.721, Persons under age 35 (Odds = 2.011, those who are unmarried (Odds = 1.31), racial and ethnic minorities (Odds = 1.48 and 1.49 for Blacks and others, respectively), nonmetropolitan residents (Odds = 1.42), those who have family members with employer-sponsored insurance in their own name (1.70), and persons with relatively lower levels of education (Odds = 3.42 and 1.65 for less than high school and high school degree, respectively) are more likely to lack insurance from an employer. All of these characteristics are more closely associated with the working poor, with the exception that it is higher income groups that are more likely to have other family members with insurance in their own name, as noted previously in Table 1 . The only variable here which was not associated with employersponsored insurance was having a child under age 18 (Odds = .97). In Model 2, the respondent's employment characteristics are added. Persons who are employed less than full-time (Odds = 7.17 and 3.00 for less than 20 hours and 20-35 hours, respectively), who are not members of a union (Odds = 2.82), who do not work for multiple site employers (Odds = 1.84), who work in firms with fewer than 100 employees (Odds = 3.50, 1.88, and 1.48 for under 10, 10-25, and 26-100 employees, respectively), who earn less than $7.50 per hour (Odds = 5.00, 3.22, 1.86, for less than $3.50, $3.50-$4.99, and $5.00-$7.49 per hour, respectively), and who have less than one year tenure on the job (Odds = 3.46), are also more likely to lack employer-sponsored insurance in their own name. Again, these characteristics were found to be associated with the working poor, as previously shown in Table 1 . In contrast, those who work in construction/repair, or the finance, insurance, professional, or public administration industries are more likely (than individuals in personal service, entertainment, and recreation) to have insurance through their employer. We also find that the addition of the set of employment characteristics to the model reduces the previously significant effects of being female, unmarried, and living in a nonmetropolitan area. Finally, as hypothesized, the inclusion of the employment context as a set of variables explains the variation in the lack of employer-sponsored health insurance in one's own name beyond the human capital/sociodemographic characteristics by themselves (p < .001).
Our next set of analyses was designed to address whether the employment context influences the odds of lacking health insurance from one's bmployer in the same way, across levels of income. In order to determine the appropriate analytical strategy for this question, we conducted a likelihood ratio test for homogeneity of structure. We compared the -2 log likelihood estimate from the model without poverty status minus the sum of the -2 log likelihood estimates from the poverty-specific models. The results of this test provided evidence that the null hypothesis of no difference in the structural relationships across poverty status should be rejected ( p < .05). Therefore, models were estimated separately for the (1) working poor; (2) economically vulnerable; and (3) non-poor. The odds ratios of the working poor and non-poor (1:3) were then compared across models to ascertain whether differences exist across models-e.g., do the predictor variables influence the probability of lacking employer-sponsored insurance for the working poor and non-poor in the same way? A Z-test was performed to ascertain whether the odds ratios are significantly different from one another.
The data reveal only modest support for the third hypothesis. Most employment characteristics (and human capital/sociodemographic factors) have similar effects across income categories. The number of hours worked per week, whether one works at a single-or multiple-site employer, the work force size, the type of industry, wage level, and length of tenure on the job influence the likelihood of a worker having employer-sponsored health insurance in a similar manner regardless of income or poverty status. Of these factors, it appears that the number of hours employed, wage, work force size, and length of tenure on the job have a particularly strong impact on the odds of coverage, regardless of income. People who work part-time, have lower wages, who work in small firms, and who have been on the job for less than one year are especially vulnerable to being without employer-sponsored coverage. These data lend support to Colatosti's (1992) contention that workers are increasingly exploited by tenure requirements before they are eligible to receive health insurance.
Two employment characteristics have differential impacts across income groups. First, being in a union increases the odds of having insurance more for the poor than for the non-poor (Odds = 6.36 and 2.63 for poor and non-poor, respectively). These data suggest that unions play a critical role in securing benefits for the working poor. Second, the data suggest that a minimum wage also has different effects on the odds of being insured by an employer; minimum wage earners in poor households are over 5 times as likely to lack employer-sponsored insurance than minimum wage earners in non-poor households (Odds = 21.12 and 4.06 for poor and non-poor, respectively). In other words, it appears that even minimum wage earners in non-poor households have "better" jobs than workers in poor households, at least with respect to the receipt of health insurance.
Like employment characteristics, most human capital/sociodemographic factors affect the odds of coverage in a similar fashion across income. Sex, age, marital status, racelethnicity, residential location, and a child under 18 years old in the home all have effects upon the likelihood of receiving employer-sponsored coverage that are similar for the poor and for the non-poor.
However, two human capital/sociodemographic variables have different effects upon the odds of lacking employer-sponsored insurance. First, having another family member with insurance in their own name increases the odds that the non-poor will lack their own employer-sponsored insurance, with little effect for the working poor (Odds = 3.30 and .50 for the non-poor and poor, respectively). We speculate that members of non-poor households have choices unavailable to the poor. They may choose to forgo their own employer-sponsored insurance because other members of their insurable unit (i.e., a spouse) have better policies under which they could choose to be included. The data also suggest that low levels of education have different effects across income categories, with lower levels of education being an even greater detriment to the working poor than to the non-poor (Odds = 4.13 and 1.78 for poor and non-poor with less than a high school degree).
DISCUSSION
From a nationally-representative sample of U.S. adult workers from the 1987 National Medical Expenditure survey, this research compared the sources of health insurance coverage, and the antecedents of employersponsored insurance of the working poor, to persons with higher incomes. Our findings provide additional evidence that the health insurance system in the United States as currently configured, is neither inclusive nor equitable. Several conclusions can be gleaned from these analyses which are relevant to discussions of health care reform. First, only one out of four working poor persons received insurance from their employer, compared to more than two out of three non-poor workers. Government programs, as currently configured, do little to reduce this inequity. One reform strategy that has been suggested is simply to expand Medicaid to uninsured persons. If such a policy is to be effective in reducing the number of uninsured individuals, it must extend coverage to all uninsured low income and poor persons, including those who are employed. This approach would, of course, expand the Medicaid program substantially. However, because Medicaid is viewed by many as "welfare," it is seen in a rather negative light. Consequently, any plans to increase the program's scope considerably will likely be met with considerable public scrutiny and be the subject of widespread criticism.
Second, these data suggest that employment contexts are critical factors in discerning current patterns of employer-sponsored health insurance. Future health care reforms should not be predicated upon individualistic, human capital explanations for differences in coverage. Instead, the lack of health insurance is a by-product of unequal economic structuresthe uninsured are not an idiosyncratic group replete with personal failure. This factor is critical to reform measures because it illustrates that a continued reliance upon employer "good-will" without requiring employers to provide insurance will systematically leave segments of our working population uninsured. If we intend to continue ahead with our previous policy of linking employers and insurance, we must guarantee that certain vulnerable groups (i.e., part-time workers, those in small firms, those who earn low wages) will be included in coverage schemes either by employer mandates or by government intervention.
Third, most of the variables examined here influenced coverage in a similar fashion across income thresholds. This suggests that legislative reforms that address these particular correlates have the potential to have a correspondingly positive effect for workers regardless of household income. For example, because workers at small firms are disadvantaged regardless of income category, policies that create incentives for small employers to purchase insurance for their employees, or mandate all employers to provide health insurance, or policies that create "risk pools" that lessen the costs of insurance for small employers, have the potential to increase the odds of coverage among workers in all income categories. This does not mean, however, that such policies would have the same magnitude of effect for all groups. The working poor are overrepresented in small firms, for example. Therefore, a policy that increased coverage in small businesses would effect a greater proportion of the poor work force, because nearly one in three working poor is employed in a small business, compared to less than one in five non-poor workers.
Finally, there are several variables that exerted different effects on the odds of coverage across income categories: unionization, minimum wage, level of education, and whether another family member had insurance in their name. The differences in employment contexts are of particular interest here, given the very large discrepancy in their effects and the fact that these can be ameliorated more easily by social policy. It appears that poor workers cannot depend upon employers to "look out after them"; instead, they benefit more from the protective structure of a union. These findings are consistent with other research which suggests that unions are critical for securing benefits for disadvantaged groups including ethnic minorities and women (Goldfield 1987; Krecker and O'Rand 1991; Seccombe 1993; Seccombe et al. 1994) . We also see, interestingly, that while all minimum wage earners are disadvantaged they are not equally disadvantaged. Minimum wage earners who have household incomes above the poverty line are considerably better off with respect to having employer-sponsored health insurance than their counterparts who live in households below the poverty line. Why this is the case is not well understood. Perhaps these two groups are working in different types of jobs-differences that are not measured in these analyses. We anticipate that workers from poor households have fewer choices available to them. They need money now, and do not have the luxury of "shopping around" for the best job (i.e., the one with the most fringe benefits attached). Furthermore, they may have additional structural impediments (i.e., limited English skills, transportation barriers, and so on) which further narrow the opportunities available to them.
One limitation of this research that should be noted is that the NMES public-use tape used in these analyses provides information with respect to the receipt of health insurance, not whether it is offered by an employer. Given our choice of sample, we have selected respondents who are most likely to accept insurance if it is offered (i.e., full-time workers). However, it is likely that some unknown portion of the employed full-time population deliberately declined coverage, and therefore are coded as not receiving coverage even though it was actually offered by an employer. We have attempted to minimize this error by controlling for selection effects such as having another family member with employer-sponsored insurance in their own name. However, since we did not control for all possible selection effects (e.g., cost of premium), it is likely that some degree of error persists, and therefore the results should be interpreted with this in mind.
In conclusion, it is ironic that nearly half of the working poor are uninsured: They are playing by the "rules" of the health insurance coverage scheme in this country by possessing employment, and they are productive members of our economic system, yet they are without coverage for themselves and for their families. Further discussions of health care reform must recognize the importance of either mandating employers to provide benefits to workers, as is the case in Hawaii, or doing away with the employer-financing mechanism altogether, as is the case in nearly every industrialized (and many nonindustrialized) countries throughout the world. A health care financing system such. as is currently found in the United States-one that continues to rely on employer "good will" -further exaggerates the polarization between the "haves" and the "have-nots." NOTES 1. The term "working poor" is used literally here.
It refers to employed persons with household incomes below the federal poverty line, adjusted for year and family size. We use the term "economically vulnerable" to refer to workers with household incomes between the poverty line and 200 percent of poverty. These persons are sometimes referred to as working poor, although that term does not correctly describe them. We believe that "economically vulnerable" is a more accurate, and therefore a more appropriate, description. "Non-poor" refers to workers with household incomes above 200 percent of poverty. 2. Individuals who were self-employed (N = 1,637) were deleted because the survey did not collect information on certain workplace characteristics that were critical to our analyses. Persons reporting negative income (N = 27) were also deleted. Finally, persons assigned a zero weight,indicating that they did not participate in Round Four of data collection were deleted because their relative poverty status could not be determined (N = 705). 3. Individual weights were derived from weights developed at the dwelling unit level. Dwelling units were first weighted to account for nonresponse, and then post-stratified to better reflect the 1987 Current Population Survey (CPS) estimates. The post-stratification procedure took into consideration: (1) the race/ ethnicity of the reference person; (2) the age of the reference person; (3) the number of individuals in the dwelling unit; (4) the census region; and (5) the sex and marital status of the respondent. The weights were then normed to be equal to the final sample size (Clogg and Eliason 1987) . The survey data analysis package known as SUDAAN was utilized to account for the effects of the complex sample design (Sha et al. 1991 ). 4. There are a number of different methods for managing missing cases in the social sciences (Little and Rubin 1990) . In these analyses we concluded that there was not a firm basis on which to impute missing values, either from a direct analysis of the incomplete data by the method of maximum likelihood or a multiple imputation method based on explicit and implicit models. Given that the number of respondents eliminated due to missing values (N = 331) constituted a relatively small portion of the sample (4.3%), we concluded that no undue bias was being introduced. 5. The poverty variable was constructed by The Agency for Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR) from income data collected on 26 separate types of income in Supplement Four to the Round Four interview. Data were imputed by AHCPR, if possible, when unavailable. NMES income totals, and means and percentages of the population reporting income by source, were roughly equivalent to the 1988 Marsh Supplement to the CPS for calendar year 1987 for both the total population 15 years of age and older, and the population disaggregated by racelethnicity and gender of the individual. For further information or procedural details, see AHCPR (1991). 6. The NMES public-use tape employed in this analysis provides information on who is receiving coverage through their employer, not on who is offered coverage. We recognize that the inability to identify those persons in this data source that were offered coverage by their employer but declined to accept it diminishes our understanding of the precise relationship between the characteristics of a worker and their job that are associated with coverage. However, given our choice of sample (i.e., the fact that we used only full-time workers if available in the household), we have included individuals who are most likely to accept coverage, thereby minimizing this bias. 7. Further race or ethnic breakdowns were not possible, as the small number of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Asian, Native American, and other minority groups would have produced unstable estimates.
